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THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROLF SALM, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
-vs-
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 14504 
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Clerk, Suoramo Court, LHah ARGUMENT 
There was a total lack of evidence upon which to 
base an indictment. 
The only statement made before the Grand Jury was 
made by the alleged victim, Gayleen VanWagoner, in response 
to the question f,Can you describe that other gentleman, please?". 
(Assuming for their argument that the other gentleman was the 
same as the person allegedly holding her) That statement is 
as follows: !!Yes. He was oh, probably about the same height 
as Mr. Strehl. He was a thinner built person. He had a very 
large nose and I don't know why, but 1 guessed just unless they 
are like this it seemed like his teeth were you know, decayed 
in the front. It looked like he hadn't shaved for maybe two 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
days and he had quite a lot of hair. It was just in a natural 
curl." This description could refer to many hundreds of per-
sons in the State of Utah alone. The description in fact does 
not match Rolf Salm, whose nose is only of average size, whose 
teeth are not decayed in front, who is five inches shorter 
than Mr. Strehl, who does not have any more hair than one would 
expect on a man of his age, and whose hair is no more than 
slightly curly. 
§77-19-3 says "Evidence receivable. -- In the investi-
gation of a«charge for the purpose of indictment the Grand Jury 
must receive no other evidence than such as shall be given by 
witnesses produced and sworn before them, or furnished by legal 
documentary evidence, or the deposition of a witness as provided 
in §77-1-8. The Grand Jury must receive none but legal evidence, 
and the best evidence in degree, to the exclusion of hearsay or 
secondary evidence.11 The above statement of Gayleen VanWagoner 
is the only evidence set out in the Bill of Particulars which 
could qualify as receivable under §77-19-3. 
The protections of §77-19-3 can only be guaranteed 
to the Defendant by way of a Bill of Particulars. There is no 
other way a Defendant can ascertain if the evidence that the 
Grand Jury received and based its indictment on was receivable 
except through a Bill of Particulars provided by the prosecuting 
attorney. §77-19-3 also states that this evidence is the only 
evidence the Grand Jury may receive. 
The statement of Gayleen VanWagoner, which is the only 
evidence received by the Grand Jury is in effect a total lack 
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of evidence. 
Total lack of evidence is ground of quashal of an 
indictment. 
§77-23-3: A motion for quashal is available only on 
one or more of the following grounds. (1)(e) That it appears 
from a Bill of Particulars . . . that the Defendant did not 
commit the offense. An extremely literal reading of this 
statute could lead to the interpretation that an indictment 
could be quashed only if the Bill of Particulars contains affirm-
ative evidence that the Defendant did not commit the offense. 
This construction is totally unreasonable because it is virtually 
inconceible*that a prosecutor would submit a Bill of Particulars 
containing affirmative evidence that the Defendant did not 
commit the offense. In fact, under this construction anyone's 
name could be substituted for the Defendant's and that person 
would not qualify for quashal. This is clearly not the intent 
of the legislature. The only reasonable intrepretation is that 
a motion to quash is available if it appears from the Bill of 
Particulars that there was no evidence against the Defendant or 
a total lack of evidence. 
This is strenghthened by the majority rule in the 
United States. While it is clear that mere inadequacy of 
evidence is not sufficient ground for quashing an indictment, 
the weight of authority is that an indictment will be quashed 
it there is a total lack of evidence upon which the indictment 
can rest. ffIt is a generally recognized rule that an indictment 
will be quashed, dismissed, or set aside by the court on motion 
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their reach will explain away the charge.11 There are no Utah 
cases construing this statute, but the Supreme Court of 
California has recently had occasion to consider a virtually 
identical statutory provision. 
§77-19-4. The grand jury shall not be 
bound to hear evidence for the defendant; but 
it is their duty to weigh all the evidence 
submitted to them, and when they have reason 
to believe that other evidence within their 
reach will explain away the charge, they should 
order such evidence to be produced, and for 
that purpose may require the prosecuting attorney 
to issue process for the witnesses. 
§993.7 of the Penal Code of California. 
"The grand jury is not required to hear evidence 
for the defendant, but it shall weigh all the 
evidence submitted to it, and when it has 
reason to believe that other evidence within 
its reach will explain away the charge, it 
shall order the evidence to be produced, and 
for that purpose may require the district 
attorney to issue process for the witnesses." 
In Johnson v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County 
15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 742, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975), the 
court held that the district attorney is required to present 
any evidence which may be exculpatory to the grand jury. In 
that case, the prosecution had originally proceeded by way of 
information, and a preliminary hearing was held at which the 
defendant presented evidence. The magistrate resolved conflicts 
in evidence in defendant's favor, and dismissed the information. 
The district attorney thenx^ ent before the grand jury and failed 
to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant (most importantly, 
the defendant's own testimony), of which he was aware. 
The facts of Johnson v. Superior Court are virtually 
identical to the present case. In this case the prosecution 
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of the accused where there is no evidence whatever before the 
Grand Jury tending to support the charges contained on the 
indictment." 41 Am.Jur. 2d 1028, (see also Annotation 31 ALR 
1485 cases cited therein and late case service to that annotation) . 
A consideration of the relevant policy factors also 
indicates that Utah should adopt the majority rule. To require 
a Defendant to stand trial on a criminal indictment which is • 
totally unsupported by the evidence would subject him to an 
exceedingly heavy burden of ignominy, expense and time (not to 
mention possible interferences with his personal liberty) while 
the State would receive no offsetting benefits. In fact, such 
proceedings-could be a serious detriment to the State, since 
they are expensive, tend to further over-burden the judicial 
system, and may increase public disrespect for the legal system. 
In addition, quashing the indictment places no great 
burden on the prosecution since the prosecution may still proceed 
by information and is not precluded from getting another indict-
ment if it can show grounds therefor. 
The prosecutor knew of exculpatory evidence reasonably 
tending to negate defendant's guilt and was obliged to inform 
the Grand Jury of its nature and existence so that the Grand 
Jury could exercise its power under §77-19-4 and order the evi-
dence produced. 
§77-19-4 while providing that a Grand Jury is not 
required to hear the defendant's evidence, nevertheless places 
upon the Grand Jury the "duty to weigh all the evidence . . . 
when they have reason to believe that other evidence within 
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originally proceeded by way of information, and a preliminary 
hearing was held at which the defendant presented evidence. 
The judge resolved the conflicts in the defendant's favor 
and dismissed the information. The prosecutor then went before 
the Grand Jury and failed to disclose evidence favorable to 
the defendant (most importantly the defendant's own testimony), 
of which he was aware. 
In Johnson v. Superior Court the court reasoned that 
if a prosecutor fails to inform the Grand Jury of evidence 
facorable to the defendant, the Grand Jury's obligation to 
order evidence produced which migh tend to explain away the 
charge would"be impossible to fulfill since the Grand Jury is 
usually unaware of the existence of evidence not presented to 
it by the prosecutor. As the court stated, "if the district 
attorney does not bring exculpatory evidence to the attention 
of the Grand Jury, the Jury is unlikely to learn of it. We 
hold, therefore, that when a district attorney seeking an 
indictment is aware of evidence reasonably tending to negate 
guilt, he is to inform the Qrand Jury of its nature and existence 
so that the Grand Jury may exercise its power under the statute 
to order the evidence produced." 
A total lack of evidence is grounds for quashal and 
there was a total lack of evidence presented to the Grand Jury 
in this case. In addition> the failure of the prosecutor to 
divulge exculpatory evidence to the Grand Jury is ground for 
quashal. Either of the above is sufficient to require a quashal 
of the indictment, however, the district court refused to quash 
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in the fact of both of these and, therefore, the Defendant 
prays this court to grant a Writ of Prohibition against the 
Third Judicial District Court or any other duly constituted 
Court in the State of Utah, prohibiting any further proceedings 
against Salm in Criminal Case No. 28321, State v. Strehl and 
Salm. 
DATED this /h day of AprJJU-JLS76. 
L. M. HAYNIE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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the Salt Lake County Attorney, 240 East 4th South, Salt Lake 
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